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Foreword
It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright
Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff
College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes our best student
research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC
research program encourages our students to move beyond
the school’s core curriculum in their own professional devel-
opment and in “advancing air and space power.” The series
title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit
embodied in earlier generations of Airmen. Projects selected
for publication combine solid research, innovative thought,
and lucid presentation in exploring war at the operational
level. With this broad perspective, the Wright Flyer Papers
engage an eclectic range of doctrinal, technological, organiza-
tional, and operational questions. Some of these studies pro-
vide new solutions to familiar problems. Others encourage us
to leave the familiar behind in pursuing new possibilities.
By making these research studies available in the Wright
Flyer Papers, ACSC hopes to encourage critical examination
of the findings and to stimulate further research in these
areas.
RONALD R. LADNIER
Brigadier General, USAF
Commandant
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Abstract
In September 1918, the EEF concluded its campaign in
Palestine by routing the Turkish forces at the battle of
Megiddo. Under command of British general Allenby, the
EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engage-
ments in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and
synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby pro-
vided future military professionals and historians with a
shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms opera-
tions. In terms of surprise, concentration, and operational
balance of forces, the culmination of the Palestine cam-
paign was a foreshadowing of the German blitzkrieg used
in World War II.
Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were
lost for future generations of military officers. Focusing on
the culture and romanticism of the horse cavalry, students
of the Palestine battles garnered little instruction on the
emerging trends of combined arms operations that inte-
grated air and ground mobility into a decisive operational-
level weapon.
This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession
of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in com-
bined arms operations. It examines the context of the Middle
Eastern theater of World War I, describing how “western
front myopia” added to the overshadowing of operations con-
ducted in Palestine. The paper also delves into the role of
airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a
relatively new weapon system into his force structure and
operational planning and execution. Though largely unex-
plored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s
final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step
in the evolution of combined arms operations.
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Armageddon’s Lost Lessons
The myth of blitzkrieg that ensconced Hitler’s forces in an
aura of invulnerability during the opening phases of World
War II has equally clouded history’s view on the development
of combined arms operations. While it appeared that a rev-
olution in warfare was taking place on the European conti-
nent in the spring of 1940, a foreshadowing of blitzkrieg had
taken place in the deserts of Palestine less than a quarter
century before.1 There, on 19 September 1918, infantry,
cavalry, and air forces under command of Gen Edmund H.
H. “Bull” Allenby stormed through Turkish defenses at the
battle of Megiddo. It was one of the greatest exhibitions of
mobility and pursuit in the history of World War I and ul-
timately led to the surrender of the Ottoman Empire. In an
era of costly trench warfare, Megiddo represented near per-
fection for the British in their use of combined arms opera-
tions and, in the process, enthralled both press and public.
For all its impact on popular sentiment at the time—its
impact on the overall war effort was debated heatedly
among British leadership in 1918—Megiddo appears to be
more a foreshadowing of blitzkrieg than an influence on
doctrinal development. In The Roots of Blitzkrieg, author
James Corum gives no indication that the Palestine theater
impacted German military reform during the interwar pe-
riod. The British, for their part, appear to have missed a
rare opportunity to learn what Megiddo might hold for the
future of warfare. Focusing on the romanticism of the “last
cavalry charge” instead of on the efficacy of combined arms
operations, conservative military leaders saw the battle only
as an illustration of the cavalry’s enduring role as the arme
blanche. Had they looked beyond their traditional mounts,
one could argue that military leaders may have been bet-
ter prepared to confront the Germans in the battles of
1940 to 1942.2
If the architects of blitzkrieg garnered few if any lessons
from Megiddo, historians of airpower have seemingly made
comparable oversights. Lee Kennett’s The First Air War,
1914–1918 contains no analysis of Allenby’s use of air as-
sets, while John Morrow allots only one short paragraph to
the subject in The Great War in the Air. Likewise, air historian
1
Robin Higham goes only as far to say that Allenby’s cam-
paign “was for its day as perfect an example of the proper
application of airpower as the German blitzkriegs in 1940
or the Israeli campaign of 1967.”3 But unexamined battles
provide few lessons, and thus, pose interesting questions
concerning how military leaders and historians choose to
learn from the past.
This paper argues that the 1940 German attack in France,
while extraordinary, was not the first successful applica-
tion of air-ground coordination in a blitzkrieg style of war.
By examining the role of airpower in the context of World
War I and then using the culmination of the Palestine cam-
paign as a case study for analysis, one can discern the en-
during yet lost lessons of airpower and its role in combined
arms operations. Though largely unexplored by military pro-
fessionals and historians, Allenby’s final battle at Megiddo
proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of com-
bined arms operations.
The Great Debate: The Indirect Approach
At the outbreak of World War I, Egypt abruptly became
a strategic concern for the British Empire. Within its terri-
tory ran the Suez Canal, “the most direct route between
England and her far eastern possessions.”4 It was through
this narrow passageway that troops and supplies from
India, Australia, and New Zealand were expected to pass,
thus sustaining the mounting costs of the Allied war effort
in Europe. The Turkish Empire, having entered the war on
Germany’s side, understood the criticality of this logistical
corridor and in February 1915 launched raids against the
canal under the nominal command of German colonel Count
Kress von Kressenstein. The British defenses held, though
logistical constraints and cautious leadership prevented
any pursuit into the inhospitable deserts of the Sinai and
beyond.5
The ill-fated Gallipoli campaign forestalled subsequent
Turkish forays against the Suez during 1915, but the British
withdrawal from the Dardanelles at the end of the year al-
lowed the Turks to reconcentrate their troops in the Sinai.
By the time Gen Sir Archibald Murray took command of
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the British forces in Egypt in March 1916, the Turks had
already made two unsuccessful raids against the canal. One
month later they made another more vigorous attempt at
Romani but were convincingly defeated, thanks in part to
well-timed aerial reconnaissance by the British. By the close
of 1916, Murray had driven the Turks out of the Sinai, forc-
ing them to establish defensive positions in the southern
portion of Palestine at Gaza.6
With no decision being reached in France and events
taking a positive turn in Egypt, members of the British War
Council, most notably First Lord of the Admiralty Winston
Churchill, began arguing for a more indirect approach to
the war effort. Churchill’s proposals fell on fertile ears, for
Prime Minister David Lloyd George reasoned that if Turkey
were pushed out of the war, then Germany and Austria
would feel they were “being isolated and would soon be en-
circled and invaded from the south.”7 This “eastern” ap-
proach to the war effort came under sharp criticism, specifi-
cally from the chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS),
Field Marshal Sir William R. Robertson. Robertson, a res-
olute Westerner, argued that any siphoning of forces from
France would undermine the Allies’ chances for final vic-
tory. “The first rule in all wars,” he stated, “is to concen-
trate in the main theatre all forces that can be made avail-
able. Any departure from this rule has invariably proved
disastrous.” The debate would last throughout the war and
beyond and ultimately lead to Robertson’s resignation as
the CIGS.8
Lloyd George and the Easterners hoped to reach a decision
in Egypt with a minimal cost in lives, thus boosting British
morale. Fighting in Egypt and Palestine offered opportunities
not found on the exhausting western front. Gen Sir John
Shea extolled the virtues of the desert, since “the great part
of it was that you were in open warfare. It was a war of move-
ment. . . . It was entirely different, and it was a great happi-
ness to fight there compared to the frustration of trench war-
fare in France.”9 While logistical constraints such as water
supplies dominated operational maneuver in Palestine,
Turkish defenders ensured there were at least some parallels
to the fighting in the West. Around Gaza, the trench sys-
tem was deadly elaborate and nicknamed “The Labyrinth.”
The 6,444 Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) casualties
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suffered in an attack there during April 1917 attested to the
effectiveness of trench warfare, regardless of the theater.10
Of course, what most set Palestine apart from the
trenches of the western front were the environs. Tempera-
tures frequently topped 100 degrees in the shade, making
living conditions for men and horses insufferable. For Air-
men, the “intense heat made the air so bumpy” that train-
ing exercises were normally suspended after early morning.11
Yet while the weather restricted pilots in one sense, the ter-
rain offered distinct advantages in another. Whether in the
open country of the Sharon Plains or the rugged hills of the
Judean Range, horse cavalry could only operate so far in the
intense heat and suffocating dust. Flight rendered such
limitations immaterial. As Trevor Henshaw stated, “Air re-
connaissance was to prove particularly effective in this harsh
and terrible environment where conditions made any equiva-
lent scope of reconnoitre on the ground completely impos-
sible.”12
The Turkish force that the Allied Airmen pursued was
an army of contrasts. In defense the Turks had proven
their mettle early, as any veteran of Gallipoli would attest.
Murray was no less impressed with their offensive suitabil-
ity. In a cable to the CIGS, he noted: “My cavalry are hardly
faster in the desert than the Turkish infantry, who are fine
active men in good condition.”13 But while the individual
soldier had his merits, he was continually plagued by sup-
ply and transport shortages, thus threatening theaterwide
mobility. Though possessing a great number of machine
guns—the great equalizer in World War I—the Turks relied
almost solely on the Germans for technical services and air
support. Logistical shortcomings would increasingly have
a detrimental impact on the Turkish soldier, affecting health,
morale, and more importantly, combat efficiency on the front
lines.14
Integration with German leadership proved to be as trou-
blesome as logistical support. Von Kressenstein, who led
Turkish raids against the Suez Canal in early 1915, took
over the entire Sinai sector soon afterwards and twice beat
back Murray’s attempts at capturing Gaza. But the British
seizure of Baghdad impelled the creation of an army group
intent on its recapture. Code-named Yilderim, meaning
lightning, the army group consisted of the Turkish Sixth
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and Seventh Armies and the German Asia Corps. Redi-
rected to counter another British assault into Palestine in
September 1917, Yilderim was now commanded by the for-
mer chief of the German general staff Erich von Falken-
hayn. Emphasizing mobility and a flexible defense, Falken-
hayn was succeeded in March by Gen Liman von Sanders,
commander of the Turkish Fifth Army and defender of Gal-
lipoli. Believing that “the average Turkish soldier was un-
able to cope with mobile warfare,” Sanders instead em-
phasized a more static defense.15 These persistent changes in
leadership and tactical emphasis did little to alleviate ten-
sions between Turkish and German officers who were al-
ready suspect of one another’s intentions and abilities.16
For Sir Archibald Murray, mistrust within the enemy
command structure had little impact on the supply prepa-
rations that were consuming his efforts. By the end of 1916,
the EEF had laid over 300 miles of water piping and rail-
way and had constructed over 200 miles of metalled road.17
With a logistical footprint secure on the southern frontiers
of Palestine, Murray attempted to dislodge the Turks from
their defensive works in and around Gaza (see map 1, appen-
dix A). The ensuing attack on 26 March 1917 was a disas-
ter, resulting in little more than the 4,000 casualties suf-
fered by British forces. Lack of water for the cavalry, poor
intelligence and staff work, and even the fog of war were
blamed for the reverse. Murray unfortunately exaggerated
Turkish losses—which were nearly half of the EEF’s—while
understating his own misfortunes, and London quickly sent
word to push north towards Jerusalem.18
Less than one month later, though using gas shells and
a detachment of tanks, the British were repulsed yet again.
The outcome was no more successful than the first attempt
at Gaza and resulted in even heavier casualties. Despite
what Kressenstein later noted as “weakness and exhaus-
tion of the defending troops and the shortage of munitions
and supplies,” British troops could not break through the
trenches.19 Lloyd George was infuriated and blamed the
failure on “flabbiness and lack of nerve” in the EEF com-
mand structure. While leadership certainly played a criti-
cal factor in the two Gaza reverses, others saw a more tan-
gible explanation for the lack of success. According to
historian H. A. Jones, “The margin between victory and
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failure in the battle was extremely narrow, and had the
British had local air superiority, victory could perhaps have
been assured.”20 Murray’s successor would consequently
ensure that no such mistakes were made again.
The War in the Air
If Archibald Murray did not fully comprehend the po-
tential of airpower, he was certainly not alone. British mil-
itary theorist Sir B. H. Liddell Hart asserted, “Military ap-
preciation of air values was a slow growth,” as evidenced by
French general Ferdinand Foch’s comment when viewing
the Circuit de l’Est. “That is good sport, but for the Army the
aeroplane is worthless.”21 Initially interested in flight for its
observation and reconnaissance capabilities, military leaders
began to realize that superiority in the air was of increasing
importance. By May 1917, Field Marshal Henri Philippe
Petain informed the French Minister of War: “Aviation has
assumed a capital importance; it has become one of the in-
dispensable factors of success. . . . It is necessary to be
master of the air.”22
With no substantial precedents to guide them, World War
I leaders in all theaters found the process of achieving mas-
tery of the air somewhat daunting. True, aerial bombing had
been experimented with in Libya during the 1911–1912
Italo-Turkish War, but such engagements were far from
standardized. Even through the first years of the Great War,
“air fighting was a thoroughly individualistic affair.”23 Pilot
training focused on the basics, and unseasoned aviators
often taxed their abilities just to keep their planes in the air.
As individual skills evolved, so did the integration of air-
craft into army training exercises. During the 1912 British
war games, future Royal Flying Corps (RFC) commander
Air Chief Marshal Hugh M. Trenchard, acting as an aerial
observer for one of the opposing forces, was able to redirect
a wrongly dispatched cavalry force. With new orders, the
cavalry under the command of General Allenby changed
direction, and Trenchard’s unit won the war game.24 The
battlefield was gradually becoming three-dimensional.
Improvements in technology were among the most con-
sequential reasons why airpower was impacting events on
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the ground. In 1914, planes could rarely achieve speeds of
90 miles per hour, while mechanical reliability was shaky
at best. The British Vickers fighter seldom topped 70 miles
per hour and, as one observer laconically noted, “its engine
was prone to discard parts of its mechanism in midair.”25
Despite these problems, aircraft production continued at
an earnest pace, and pilots increasingly found themselves
seated in more capable planes. Thus, with quantity and
quality expanding at tremendous rates, Airmen became
better suited to support ground forces. The problem, as
with ground-to-ground coordination, was developing an ef-
fective communications framework.26
As artillery began to dominate the battlefield in World
War I, officers found that aircraft could provide much more
assistance for the infantrymen than simple reconnais-
sance. Aerial intelligence quickly developed into artillery
spotting, and though initial communication techniques
were rudimentary (such as dropping messages to the sup-
ported artillery battery), air-ground coordination became
continually more refined. By 1917 the RFC had 31 wireless
stations working in tandem with artillery units in Pales-
tine. Integration was no less synchronized in the West,
where aerial photography became the fundamental means
of mapping out the tangled web of trenches along the front
lines.27
With progress being made in speed, maneuverability, and
firepower, the buildup of air forces in the Middle East grew
at an amazing rate. In July 1916, when the RFC Middle
East Brigade was formed, Murray had only three line
squadrons of substandard B.E.2c aircraft. Despite their
inferiority to the German Fokker Eindekkers, British pilots
still found that their impact on ground troops could be
substantial. An RFC policy paper written in 1916 strikingly
noted that the “appearance of hostile aircraft over the front
affected morale ‘all out of proportion to the damage’ which
the aircraft can inflict.”28 By 1918 the brigade had grown
in both quantity and quality. Seven squadrons and one bal-
loon company could now be brought to bear, including 37
R.E.8 and 21 S.E.5a aircraft, 18 Bristol Fighters, and one
Handley Page bomber.29
With new capabilities, the British approach to air com-
bat operations was in marked contrast to the Germans’. As
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a whole, the men of the Royal Flying Corps focused their
efforts on taking the fight to the enemy. Col Arthur E. Bor-
ton, commander of the RFC’s Palestine Brigade, illustrated
such offensive spirit in a letter home during Allenby’s
Megiddo campaign: “Pilots who were in roving commissions
to attack anything on the ground which formed a target
were coming in and hurriedly filling up their machines and
going off again in fear they might miss something.”30 Across
the lines, the defensive-minded Germans aimed at prevent-
ing Allied aircraft from entering their airspace and attack-
ing friendly ground troops or gaining valuable intelligence.
As with ground operations, technology was having a pro-
nounced impact on the prosecution of the war in the air.
Tactical principles, seemingly validated by recent battle-
field experiences, were being negated by rapid technologi-
cal advances in the instruments of war.31
The operational implications of this growth were felt es-
pecially in the Middle Eastern theater. Combatant com-
manders there found that air superiority largely depended
upon the quality of the aircraft and, until the summer of
1917, the German focus on technical superiority rather
than on quantity paid large dividends. As David L. Bullock
relates, “the Germans allotted a few of their best machines
to each theater in the belief that these would be able to
make a disproportionately beneficial impact.”32 The single-
seater Fokker and two-seater Aviatik wreaked havoc on the
slower, less maneuverable B.E.2c and often made British
observation flights both dangerous and highly ineffective.
Colonel Borton lamented in 1915, “Our daily reconnais-
sance is a positive torture.”33
What most hurt the British by not achieving command
of the air in the Middle East was the role that aircraft were
having in the desert environment. Pilots were tasked with
both tactical and strategic reconnaissance sorties, all the
while cooperating with supported artillery units and pho-
tographing enemy positions along the front lines. Aerial op-
erations were taking on critical roles once performed solely
by mounted cavalry units. As the Turks became adept at
camouflaging their entrenchments to confront this new
threat, the machines of the German Flieger Abteilung (flying
units) continued to hamper British efforts in gaining criti-
cal operational information. In May 1917, Murray requested
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additional aircraft from the War Office to supplement his
efforts and, coupled with Allenby’s subsequent insistence
on achieving air superiority, one month later the RFC finally
received aircraft able to compete with the Germans across
the operational spectrum.34
June 1917 proved to be a pivotal month for the Royal
and Australian Flying Corps in Palestine. With the arrival
of the Vickers Bullet, Bristol monoplane fighters, and the
single-seater S.E.5 aircraft, the EEF had the technological
superiority needed to achieve theaterwide air superiority.
With fighters able to reach speeds of over 100 miles per
hour and climb faster than any German aircraft, the British
quickly set out on offensive missions aimed at regaining
command of the air. Though limited in numbers, the new
fighters and scouts “spread a feeling of exhilaration, not
only among the squadrons, but also in the army.”35 By
September 1917 the RFC was well on its way to recovering
air dominance, which it would subsequently retain until
the end of the Palestine campaign.
The “Bull” Breaks Loose
Sir Archibald Murray was not able to benefit from the
EEF’s repossession of air superiority. His failure at Second
Gaza left officials in London no choice but to replace him
with a commander who could achieve much-needed re-
sults in an otherwise gloomy war effort. Prime Minister
David Lloyd George initially offered command to Gen Jan
Smuts, but the South African declined in the belief that he
would not receive support from the War Office (and the
CIGS in particular) for a “sideshow” effort. Upon Robert-
son’s recommendation, command fell to General Allenby,
who was then directing the Third Army in France. Al-
lenby’s initial reaction was one of “dismay,” but as biogra-
pher Archibald Wavell contends, “If the prime minister
wanted a man to put fresh movement into a stagnant cam-
paign there could be no better choice than Allenby.”36 In
the months to come, the execution of the Palestine cam-
paign would validate Lloyd George’s selection of Allenby
and provide history with a shining example of the power of
combined arms operations at the operational level of war.
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General Allenby was 56 years old when he took com-
mand of the EEF in June 1917. He had served in the In-
niskilling Dragoons as a young officer and deployed to
South Africa during the Boer War, gaining valuable experi-
ences that would serve him well in the years to come. He
learned the importance of using cavalry forces to block the
withdrawal of enemy forces and the value of a hard-
pressed pursuit. Allenby also realized that proper utiliza-
tion of resources in meeting well-defined objectives was
imperative in cavalry operations. It was a lesson few British
generals fully appreciated against the elusive Boers in the
veldt of South Africa.37
In 1910 Allenby was appointed inspector-general of cav-
alry after successful command of the 5th Lancers, and
while he “supported the introduction of machine guns and
stressed the value of firepower,” he also professed that “in-
tervention by mounted action and the sword would still
occur on the modern battlefield.”38 Service in France would
show that Allenby’s predictions were forward thinking but
not flawless. And, like all commanders dealing with the
frustrations of trench warfare, he was criticized by some
officers as being unimaginative and ignorant of tactical re-
alities. Gen Sir Hubert Gough, commander of the British
Fifth Army, described Allenby as “mentally somewhat lazy”
and a leader “who never suggested anything.”39 Commander-
in-chief Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig equally believed
that Allenby “was lacking in aptitude for high command.”40
Within days of arriving in Palestine, the new commander of
the EEF would dispel any misgivings regarding his capacity
for independent command.
As Australian Sir Henry George Chauvel, commander of
the Desert Mounted Corps (DMC), described the EEF’s
change in command climate: “Allenby went through the
hot, dusty camps of his army like a strong, fresh, reviving
wind.”41 He immediately moved the general headquarters
from Cairo to the field, thus sending a strong message to
frontline troops. Allenby kept up a vigorous pace his first
few weeks in theater, visiting units, making corrections,
and developing a general framework for his first campaign.
Almost immediately, he sought the advice of his senior
subordinates. As commander of the 4th Cavalry Division
Maj Gen George Barrow related, “Allenby was always glad
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to listen to other opinions and advice, provided this was
backed by knowledge and common sense. What angered
him was stupidity, negligence, and, most of all, disregard
of orders.”42
Such anger quickly became legendary throughout the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Allenby’s personal focus on
discipline was at the heart of his leadership philosophy. As
an example, members of the Australian Light Horse divi-
sions were prone to wearing shorts while riding in the hot
climate—an obvious uniform violation and health hazard,
as bare legs rubbing against horses’ flanks caused harm-
ful sores. Allenby’s fury upon catching such malefactors
was brutal and unrestrained. Soon troops were sending
out coded messages warning units of the commander’s im-
pending arrival. Using a nickname that Allenby had picked
up earlier in his career, the transmission simply warned:
“Bull broken loose.”43
If Allenby’s tactics in reorganizing his command were
harsh, the strategic situation allowed little margin for fail-
ure. On the western front, the summer of 1917 saw the
French army dissolve in mutiny following Nivelle’s disas-
trous offensive. Leaders in Great Britain looked to the East
for some semblance of accomplishment.44 With Murray al-
ready having laid the groundwork in terms of supplies and
security, focus in the EEF shifted from logistical arrange-
ments to regaining the operational initiative. Allenby knew
that the cavalry, employed in conjunction with the com-
bined arms of infantry and artillery, could achieve decisive
results in a theater, thus allowing for tactical mobility. The
key was to integrate the mounted arm into a larger orga-
nizational framework. To accomplish this task, the “Bull”
turned to his aerial assets.
One of Allenby’s first priorities upon taking command of
the EEF was to fortify his anemic air arm. Asking Robertson
and the War Office for additional squadrons, balloon detach-
ments, and wireless units, Allenby began setting into place a
force that could execute the mobile campaign plan that he
was now contemplating. He rapidly institutionalized cooper-
ative training between air and cavalry units, focusing on ob-
taining and processing reliable intelligence concerning
Turkish dispositions.45 With arrival of new aircraft in June,
the RFC finally obtained the means to meet such goals.
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Concurrent with changes in training was a restructur-
ing of the entire command. The army was configured into
three corps with a supporting aviation brigade. Command-
ing the DMC of two cavalry divisions and one Australian
mounted division was Sir Chauvel, a light horse battalion
commander in South Africa and a veteran of the first two
battles at Gaza. Leading XX Corps was Lt Gen Sir Philip W.
Chetwode, who had commanded a cavalry brigade in
France and whose advice and experience were invaluable
to Allenby in the coming months. Lt Gen Edward S. Bulfin
commanded XXI Corps, having already served as a division
commander with the new EEF chief in France. Finally, Maj
Gen William Salmond was in charge of the RFC’s Middle
East Brigade. Salmond, “one of the first army officers to
have appreciated the future of aviation,” served in the Boer
War and in the Boxer Rebellion in China.46 It was a com-
mand team of inestimable experience, skill, and knowledge.
And, as Allenby established himself in command, he was
to rely on their expertise to formulate and execute the
campaign plan that ultimately would drive the Turks from
Palestine.
The first step in clearing Palestine was dislodging the
Ottoman forces from their Gaza defenses. The stronghold
had thus far proved impregnable to British assault and
had cost Murray his job. Allenby’s plan called for an infantry
demonstration in front of Gaza, to include heavy artillery
bombardments and naval gun support (see map 2, appen-
dix A). Meanwhile, elements from the DMC and XX Corps
would secretly concentrate opposite the Turkish left at Beer-
sheba, assault into the garrison, and capture the water sup-
plies. Once complete, the striking force of some 40,000
troops would roll up the Turkish left flank and intercept any
retreating forces from Gaza. Allenby’s command and con-
trol (C2) functions would be considerably stretched during
the battle, for Gaza and Beersheba were separated by over
20 miles. Commanders turned to the air to fill in the gaps.
Relying on aerial photographs, Chauvel already was gain-
ing valuable information on his attack route, discovering
“that the trenches east of Beersheba lacked both barbed
wire and gardes de loup—pits dug as a trap for cavalry.”47
On the night of 30–31 October, the DMC and XX Corps
maneuvered to the east, while seaplanes spotted for the
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Royal artillery and naval guns that were hammering away
at Gaza. Late on the afternoon of 31 October, a brigade of
the Australian Light Horse—swords drawn—charged into the
defenses at Beersheba and secured the town. After a massive
artillery barrage had occurred, Bulfin’s infantry corps as-
saulted into Gaza the following day. With Turkish com-
manders still uncertain if British forces would land from
the sea, Ottoman defenses—pressured from two sides—
quickly began to crumble. One of Allenby’s staff officers
noted the effectiveness of British artillery, commenting that
three Turkish counterattacks “were blown to pieces by our
artillery fire before they could develop.”48 By 5 November,
the evacuation of Gaza began in earnest.
The Third Battle of Gaza exhibited Allenby’s talent for
orchestrating a combined arms operation while concurrently
managing the problems of transport, supply, and deception.
The battle had not been without lessons. Chauvel’s DMC
suffered a number of casualties from German aircraft, re-
vealing the vulnerability of exposed troops in a desert en-
vironment. The rough terrain east of Gaza proved difficult
for both the mounted units and their supporting logistical
assets. Allenby gave little pause and pursued the Turks
northward as they retreated towards Junction Station.
Commanding the skies and bombing and strafing retreat-
ing columns almost at will, aircraft from the RFC made the
pursuit a harrowing experience for the enemy. By 14 No-
vember, Allenby occupied Junction Station and effectively
split the Turkish forces in half.49
With the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies isolated
from one another, Allenby next set his sights on Jerusalem,
which Lloyd George had ordered taken by Christmas. Mov-
ing as rapidly as supply lines would allow, the EEF made
good progress against a stiffening Turkish defense. Coun-
terattacks increased in number and intensity. As one com-
mentator noted, “The Turkish troops fought with a remark-
able gallantry and succeeded at some points in gaining a
footing in the outer line of the British defenses.”50 By 8 De-
cember the Ottoman lines began to crack and, on the next
day, they withdrew northwards. On 11 December 1917 Al-
lenby made his formal entry into the city—the first Chris-
tian leader to do so since 1187. Kressenstein later wrote:
“From a purely military point of view, the loss of Jerusalem
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was of no importance, but the moral effect of its capture,
after having been in Turkish hands for 700 years . . . was
a severe blow to the prestige of the Caliphate and of
Turkey.”51
Allenby’s 1917 campaign had achieved significant oper-
ational and strategic objectives. He had broken through
the Gaza defenses and into the southern frontiers of Pales-
tine, giving little respite to the retreating and shaken
Turks. His capture of Jerusalem gave the Allies a much-
needed morale boost in an otherwise sagging war effort.
Operationally, he began to see the rewards of effective co-
ordination between air and ground units and how strate-
gic and tactical reconnaissance from above was vital to
maintaining mobility below. The destructive power of air-
craft was all too evident in the pursuit from Gaza to Junc-
tion Station, and if Allenby did not fully appreciate that
technical quality of the machines mattered more than
quantity, he understood that airpower was becoming a de-
cisive element of combined arms operations. This was a
significant comprehension, as Lee Kennett noted, “The new
arm was so different and its capacities and limitations so
difficult for outsiders to grasp, that friction was inevitable.”52
With 1917 coming to a close, Allenby would continue to
focus on the complete annihilation of the Turkish forces in
Palestine, while his air assets would prove yet again to be
a critical aspect of achieving such an objective.
Armageddon
Events on the western front would critically impact the
organizational structure of the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force in the early months of 1918. Russia’s collapse in late
1917 had allowed the German High Command to shift its
focus back towards the West and achieve numerical supe-
riority against Allied forces in France. Hoping to break the
deadlock of the trenches before American manpower would
again shift the balance of power in favor of the Allies, Gen
Eric von Ludendorff launched Operation Michael on 21
March. A massive drive of over 60 divisions, Michael made
initial progress but was held up at Arras, thanks to a deter-
mined British defense. Tactically, Ludendorff had achieved
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brilliant success as the Germans advanced over 40 miles
in eight days and inflicted over 300,000 casualties on the
British army alone. But strategically, Operation Michael
had come up short. The Germans had suffered an equal
number of losses, the British army had not been destroyed
or separated from the French, and American troops were
on the horizon.53
As Ludendorff continued to follow up his initial drive,
the British War Office hurriedly pulled divisions from other
theaters to fill losses in France. Allenby was forced to send
the bulk of his soldiers to the western front, retaining only
one British division. In all he would dispatch “two infantry
divisions, . . . nine yeomanry regiments, five and a half
siege batteries, twenty-three infantry battalions, five ma-
chine gun companies: upwards of 60,000 officers and
men.”54 Partially trained Indian regiments constituted the
majority of the EEF’s replacements and, while the cavalry
arm was no worse for the wear, the infantry and specialty
troops were seriously weakened. Signalmen, normally re-
quiring two years of training, were forced to become profi-
cient in just two months.55
While reorganization and training rose to the forefront of
Allenby’s concerns, he nonetheless kept pressure on the
Turks. Before losing his veteran troops, the EEF commander
ordered an expedition across the Jordan River towards
Amman in March. Hoping to combine efforts with the Arabs
and capture important Turkish garrisons in the Es Salt re-
gion, Allenby believed the raid would demonstrate Ottoman
vulnerabilities in the East. Tactically, he was mistaken; poor
weather grounded aircraft, Arab cooperation never materi-
alized, and the Turks intrepidly fought off the attack. Un-
deterred, Allenby tried again in April after the reorganiza-
tion. The results were no different as the EEF suffered its
first setbacks in nearly a year. Chetwode later wrote,
“These two expeditions of Allenby’s across the Jordan were
the stupidest things he ever did, I always thought, and very
risky.”56 While tactically a reverse, Allenby had accomplished
one key operational objective. The Trans-Jordan raids had
raised doubt in the enemy camp as to where the next
major blow would fall—either east of the Jordan River or
west, on the coastal flank. Because of the operations in
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March and April, Liman von Sanders, now in command of
the Turko-German forces in Palestine, could not be certain.
Large-scale operations able to follow up excursions
across the Jordan were precluded by reorganization efforts.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, Allenby took
advantage of this operational pause to bring his new
troops up to training standards. One soldier in the Egypt-
ian Camel Transport Corps described Allenby’s guidelines:
“The principle adopted in the infantry was to brigade one
British battalion to every three Indian battalions right
through the divisions; and this acted very well indeed, for
the White troops provided just that leaven of steadiness
lacking in the young Indians.”57 During the same time,
supply matters were tended to as the EEF’s broad-gauge
railway was extended to the front lines.
The most dramatic improvement during the summer of
1918 occurred above the lines as the Palestine Brigade
shifted from achieving air superiority to air supremacy.
The Germans were no match for the new Bristol fighters
and S.E.5a aircraft, and the effect on the armies was tan-
gible. William Massey, official news correspondent travel-
ing with the EEF, noted that the “Turk[s] had lost all faith
in German aviators, and even the German infantry came to
despise them.” Sanders even received requests from sub-
ordinates to stop German air reconnaissance, “as the sight
of the now invariably luckless air fighting was calculated to
further reduce the low morale of [the] troops.”58 Concur-
rent with aerial combat, Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots—the
RAF being officially formed on 1 April 1918—continued their
photography missions while also dropping propaganda
leaflets among the already demoralized Turkish troops. As
desertion rates swelled among the ranks, Mustafa Kemal,
commander of the Seventh Army, lamented that British
aircraft were “dropping more leaflets than bombs.”59
By autumn of 1918 Allenby decided that the time was ripe
to capitalize on the deterioration of the enemy army. His
plan, code-named Armageddon, aimed at the complete de-
struction of the Yilderim Army Group by exploiting Turkish
preconceptions created in part by the Trans-Jordan raids.
The Amman expeditions, coupled with the assault at Beer-
sheba a year earlier, had shown the vulnerability of the east-
ern flank. Using an elaborate deception plan that reinforced
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Turkish predilections, Allenby decided to reverse the for-
mula used at the Third Battle of Gaza by placing the weight
of his effort on the coastal flank (see map 3, appendix A).60
Bulfin’s XXI Corps would be the initial assault force
breaking through the enemy’s defenses along the coast
and then wheeling east towards Jenin, thereby driving the
Turks into awaiting cavalry at El Affule. The DMC would be
positioned immediately behind XXI Corps, exploiting the
breakthrough and passing into the Plain of Esdraelon.
Chauvel’s troopers would seize El Affule to block the enemy’s
withdrawal while simultaneously sending a detachment
northward towards Nazareth and the Yilderim headquar-
ters. Chetwode’s XX Corps was tasked with conducting a
diversionary attack to the east of XXI Corps the night be-
fore the main assault. The corps would then swing to its
right and position itself to block exits at the lower Jordan
River valley. Finally, an Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps (ANZAC) force under Maj Gen Edward Chaytor would
carry out demonstrations in the Jordan valley to conceal
the redeployment of two cavalry divisions to the east and
deceive the Turks that another attack on Amman was im-
minent.61
The keys to success were speed, mass, and surprise.
The DMC was placed right behind XXI Corps, thanks in
large part from lessons learned on the western front. As
Chauvel’s biographer noted, “Operations in France had
shown how important it was to position cavalry well for-
ward to move through a gap as soon as it was cleared.”62
Insistent on speed and mobility, Allenby directed that the
cavalry not get bogged down in local actions but instead
stay massed for a decisive blow against the enemy’s main
body. Paralyzing the Turkish forces would assist the DMC in
achieving its objectives. The EEF’s deception plan was con-
sequently an elaborate design, including dummy horses and
empty tents lining the Jordan valley. On the eve of battle—
set to launch on 19 September—Allenby was confident that
he had confounded von Sanders. “That the enemy expected
an offensive on my part about this date is probable. That he
remained in ignorance of my intention to attack in the
coastal [plain] with overwhelming numbers is certain.”63
Integral to the entire campaign plan would be the RAF’s
accomplishments. With one squadron attached to each
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corps, Allenby depended on the Palestine Brigade to ac-
complish a number of diverse missions—strategic and tac-
tical reconnaissance, artillery cooperation, protection from
hostile aircraft, and aerial bombing. Prior to D-day, 400
square miles of country were photographed and mapped,
while fighters ran security missions to allow for the secret
concentration of forces building up on the coastal plains.64
Thus, not only had Allenby planned for an operation in
depth, he had also fully integrated the air piece to ensure
the battle was truly three-dimensional. Correctly assessing
that the Turkish centers of gravity lay in their rail trans-
port and C2 sites, the EEF commander was about to exploit
the full spectrum of combat multipliers against a demoral-
ized enemy. As Archibald Wavell contended, the battle had
“been practically won before a shot was fired.”65
The first shots of the Megiddo battle would not be fired
by Allenby’s ground forces but instead by the Arab North-
ern Army operating on the eastern flank. Armed with a
flight of British airplanes and an armored car battery, the
Arabs attacked railway lines and station buildings at Dera
beginning on 16 September. RAF bombing runs affected
Turkish morale as much as railway traffic, while Arab raids,
led by the energetic Col T. E. Lawrence, created havoc
along enemy communication lines. Lawrence would later
note that the “Turks’ hopeless lack of initiative made their
army a ‘directed’ one, so that by destroying the telegraphs
we went far towards turning them into a leaderless mob.”
Sanders reacted as expected, sending reinforcements from
the coastal city of Haifa east towards Dera.66 Thus, with
the enemy command center distracted and soon to be com-
pletely cut off from the front lines, Allenby unleashed his
modern-day version of Armageddon.
At 4:30 A.M. on 19 September, 435 artillery guns and
trench mortars—approximately one gun every 50 yards—
opened up a 15-minute bombardment on Turkish positions
along the coastal flank. Along this critical 15-mile sector,
the EEF had massed 35,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry
troops against 8,000 Yilderim infantrymen. The night before,
XX Corps launched its diversionary attack towards the
Jordan River valley, while just after midnight a Handley-
Page bomber dropped 1,200 pounds of bombs on the El Af-
fule aerodome, railway station, and telephone exchange.67
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Sanders later noted that all “telephonic and telegraphic com-
munication between the Army Group and the armies was
completely broken from the beginning of the attack.”68 As
Bulfin’s infantry swept forward 15 minutes after the start of
the artillery barrage, the Turkish command was unaware of
the main attack’s weight and scope (see map 4, appendix A).
With the main line quickly broken by the combined
shock of artillery and machine gun fire, the Desert Mounted
Corps rushed through the breach. One squadron com-
mander from the 19th Lancers described the elation at the
cavalry’s exploitation. “As we cleared the Turkish trenches
and rode unopposed through the debris of defeat, we all
felt that the ‘G’ in ‘GAP’ for which we had waited patiently
[in France] for years had at last been reached.”69 By mid-
day the Turkish Eighth Army was in shambles, and Chau-
vel’s DMC had captured Tul Karm. All this was unknown
to Sanders, for the RAF had paralyzed Turkish nerve cen-
ters through a well-executed bombing plan. By 20 Sep-
tember cavalry forces supported by armored cars had
cleared Megiddo as XX and XXI Corps kept constant pres-
sure on the retreating Turkish armies. By nightfall on the
20th, the escape routes at El Affule, Beisan, and Dera were
shut down by Allenby’s ground forces and the Arab North-
ern Army.70
On the morning of the third day, an Australian Bristol
found the Turkish Seventh Army attempting to retreat
northward through the Wadi Fara near Nablus. A steep
gorge, the wadi formed a natural canal in which thousands
of infantry, cavalry, and transport troops became trapped.
Knocking out front and rear vehicles and thus sealing the
gorge, Bristols and D.H.9 and S.E.5a aircraft began straf-
ing and bombing runs that lasted throughout the day. The
account of one Australian squadron described the scene of
destruction. “The long, winding, hopeless column of traffic
was so broken and wrecked, so utterly unable to escape
from the barriers of hill and precipice, that the bombing
machines gave up all attempt to estimate the losses under
the attack and were sickened at the slaughter.”71 By the
end of 21 September, the Turkish Seventh Army ceased to
exist as a capable fighting force.
Despite the utter devastation created by his air and
ground forces, Allenby continued to press. Chauvel for-
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warded orders to the 5th Cavalry Division to seize Haifa,
which it did on 23 September after heavy fighting in rough
terrain. Two days later Chaytor’s force fought its way into
Amman, while elements of the 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade (of Beersheba fame) occupied Samakh, the last
Turkish stronghold west of the Jordan River. The remain-
ing Turks were now in headlong retreat, and Chauvel’s tel-
egraphic orders on 26 September disclosed that Allenby
had revised his battle plans beyond the enemy’s annihila-
tion. “Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies have been de-
stroyed. Fourth Army is retreating on Damascus via Dera.
Desert Mounted Corps will move on Damascus.”72
The pursuit northwards was aided by Lawrence and the
Arabs who, after capturing Dera, cut the lines of retreat of
the Turkish Fourth Army. Cavalry divisions from the DMC
were thus able to sustain the chase while the Arabs se-
cured the flanks. Air-ground cooperation continued during
the 100-mile pursuit to Damascus, with RAF motorcars
accompanying lead units of the DMC. Lorries carrying fuel
and stores followed closely behind, allowing air assets to
keep pace with the fast-moving cavalry. By 1 October, Dam-
ascus was occupied in force, and Allenby yet again set his
sights northwards—this time to Aleppo, 200 miles north of
Damascus. As an illustration of the depth of the EEF’s strik-
ing power, the 5th Cavalry Division had marched approxi-
mately 550 miles in just under 40 days.73 Though the final
pursuit depleted the strength of the cavalry’s men and
horses, by the end of October the final shots of the war in
the Middle East were fired at Haritan, just outside the lim-
its of Aleppo.
On 31 October 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed an
armistice with the Allies, effectively ending the Palestine
campaign. From the opening of the Megiddo battle to the
armistice, the EEF captured 75,000 prisoners, 360 artillery
pieces, and 800 machine guns. For its efforts, the EEF suf-
fered 5,666 casualties, though of those only 853 were killed
in action. As Matthew Hughes contended, the “complete-
ness of the victory at the battle of Megiddo surprised [even]
Allenby. In a letter to his wife, Allenby wrote that he was
‘almost aghast at the extent of the victory.’”74 Indeed, it had
been one of the most decisive battles fought in World War
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I, causing the ruination of three Turkish armies and the ca-
pitulation of an empire.
Immediate acclamations regarding the Megiddo victory
were majestically trumpeted in the press. The Times of Lon-
don proclaimed that a “brilliant cavalry move” had “brought
about the complete debacle of the Turkish Army in Pales-
tine.”75 Later historians such as David Bullock noted how
the battle created “a positive boost in Allied morale,” even if
the overall campaign “had no direct military bearing on the
European theatre either in negative expenditure of resources
or in outcome.”76 Contemporary military leaders and his-
torians quickly seized upon what they believed to be the
keys of Allenby’s success. Cyril Falls’s Official History gave
publicity to the “lessons of mobility, surprise, and concen-
tration of strength in front of immediate objectives.”77 Many
conservatives saw the enduring role of cavalry being vali-
dated by Megiddo, while critics believed that the Palestine
campaign held little value for study since it was conducted
against a weak enemy in a “sideshow” theater of the war.
Little discussion was given to the effectiveness of air-ground
cooperation, and it was here that the Allies—the British in
particular—missed a grand opportunity to prepare for the
next war.
Lost Lessons of Blitzkrieg?
Most all military leaders and theorists in the years be-
tween World Wars I and II were consumed with the idea of
restoring mobility to the battlefield in strategic and tactical
senses. Overlooking the difficulties experienced in the Trans-
Jordan raids and in front of the Gaza defenses, observers of
the Palestine campaign too often focused on the potency of
the mounted arm above all else. General Barrow, former
commander of the 4th Cavalry Division, later wrote how “the
arme blanche showed that, given the proper conditions, it
was still effective as in the days of Joshua.”78 Wavell’s in-
fluential The Palestine Campaigns, written in 1928, would
continue to reinforce the notion of cavalry-induced mobility.
While Wavell discussed the importance of coupling mobil-
ity with firepower, as well as the advantages of mechanized
forces, he nonetheless retained a partiality for the traditional
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mounted arm. In his final chapter on “Lessons of the Cam-
paigns,” no discussion at all was given to air-ground coor-
dination, at either the tactical or operational level.79 The
romance of the horse was too strong.
Arguably, it was not the cavalry, but its synchronization
with the Royal Air Force that proved to be the decisive fac-
tor at Megiddo. It was here that the battle’s true lessons
were missed. Allenby had tasked the Palestine Brigade with
numerous and diverse missions, from close air support for
infantry and cavalry troops to interdiction of rail lines and
key communication nodes. Operational objectives were also
achieved, as air superiority had allowed the masking of Al-
lenby’s final troop deployments to the coastal flank. What
few commentators noted was that the integrated applica-
tion of air and ground units had increased the overall ef-
fectiveness of the EEF. A US Navy lieutenant, writing in
1927, was exceptional in remarking “instead of the air force
replacing cavalry, it in fact had enhanced rather than de-
creased the value of a highly mobile mounted force.”80 Many
interwar officers overlooked the essence of this statement in
their analysis of the Megiddo campaign.
The consequences of such ignorance would prove unfor-
tunate for the Allies. French air doctrine stagnated during
the 1920s and 1930s, while in Great Britain the RAF be-
came wedded to the Douhetian-like theories of Air Chief
Marshal Hugh M. Trenchard. Such was not the case in
Germany, where chief of the general staff Hans von Seeckt
“insisted that the German army become the most air-
minded in the world.”81 Despite the shackling restrictions
of the Versailles Treaty, it was in Germany that the lessons
of air-ground combined arms operations were best applied
during the interwar period. As a British air intelligence of-
ficer correctly surmised in mid-May 1940: “It is the coop-
eration between the dive-bombers and the armoured divi-
sions that is winning the war for Germany.”82
There are unmistakable aspects of the Megiddo battle
that would later form the essence of the May 1940 blitzkrieg.
Surprise and concentration at the decisive point of battle
were achieved by virtue of a well-executed deception plan.
Allenby had integrated ground, air, and even naval fire into
a battle plan that combined maximum firepower with
deep-reaching mobility. Before the first shots were fired,
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the EEF commander’s intent was to strike the enemy
throughout the operational spectrum. Aircraft and cavalry
were synthesized to cause paralysis among the enemy’s
command and control centers, while at the same time an-
nihilating whole formations of frontline infantry troops.
Penetration and exploitation by Allenby’s mobile forces, in
the air and on the ground, led to a deadly pursuit of the
main enemy force while bypassing local pockets of resist-
ance.83 Though aircraft were bound by technological limi-
tations of the day and capable armor formations were still
years in the future, the principles of blitzkrieg at the tacti-
cal and operational levels could be found at the Battle of
Megiddo.
The problem was that such lessons by and large went un-
learned. Certainly, conditions under which the battle was
fought were ideal for the EEF. Air supremacy had already
been achieved by September 1918, and Turkish antiair-
craft defenses were nonexistent. The Turkish army, a mere
shadow of Gallipoli fame, was demoralized and in disarray.
But disavowing battlefield lessons because the enemy was
not as resolute and accomplished as the German army
proved to be an imprudent choice, for Megiddo had all the
ingredients of restoring mobility and decisiveness to the bat-
tlefield. Largely because the Ottoman army was thought of
as impotent and the Middle East theater considered incon-
sequential, there is little evidence to prove that Megiddo
greatly influenced the development of blitzkrieg. At best, it
can only be described as a foreshadowing.
But such precursors in war often hold untapped infor-
mation and insight. The Crimean War revealed the impact
of the rifled musket, while the Russo-Japanese conflict did
the same for the machine gun. Yet the majority of officers
in the American Civil War and in World War I appear to
have missed or at least greatly underestimated the tactical
implications of these new weapons. Thus, battles such as
Megiddo raise the difficult question of what lessons mili-
tary leaders and historians should derive from past con-
flicts. How should those in the profession of arms choose
to learn judiciously from the past?
The central problem to this question lies in the fact that
war is continually in a state of flux. Within this continuum,
technological and doctrinal changes ultimately force military
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leaders to adapt their methods and thinking to remain suc-
cessful on the modern battlefield. When officers fail to accli-
matize themselves to new situations, they all too often sow
seeds for future disaster. Megiddo offered a tremendous op-
portunity for the British army to adjust its thinking on how
battle might be conducted in the next war. Instead, they
were blinded by the grandeur of the last cavalry charge. Fail-
ing to differentiate between traditional and modern concepts
of battlefield mobility, those in the profession of arms missed
an occasion to formulate new theories on the effectiveness
of combined arms operations. Their studies of Megiddo
missed the essence of why the EEF proved so capable in
achieving its operational objectives.84
Adapting to new technologies and their impact on the
battlefield does require some intellectual flexibility, and
military officers have traditionally been a conservative lot.
But, far-reaching vision is not necessarily required for suc-
cess in times of change. It is doubtful that Allenby fully
grasped the true potential of airpower and its interrelation-
ship with mounted ground forces. Of greater importance,
he was willing to be innovative. As Wavell later noted, Allenby
“was not afraid to depart from the stereotyped methods of
warfare.”85 Arguably, the “Bull” had a transforming experi-
ence when he assumed command of the EEF. Divorced from
the lack of vision so prevalent on the western front, Allenby
was able to step outside the confines of the traditional set-
piece battle and develop a concept of operations that ex-
ploited and synchronized all of the available elements of
combined arms warfare.
It is here then that the true lessons of Megiddo are still
applicable today. With war being in a continual state of
reformation, those in the profession of arms must attempt
to study the past without rigid preconceptions of what war
will look like in the future. This is of course a difficult task.
While certain principles of war may be time honored, few
wars truly repeat themselves in either execution or con-
text. But, threads of continuity do exist, and it is exposing
and assessing these themes that are among the greatest
challenges to military officers. In 1918 most of the ele-
ments of modern blitzkrieg were evident at the Battle of
Megiddo. Had the British uncovered these lessons in the
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years following World War I, they may well have been bet-
ter prepared for the battles of 1940.
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